



\$~52

* **IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI**

+ CRL.M.C. 4203/2025

KARAN KUMAR BANSAL

.....Petitioner

Through: Ms. Anushkaa Arora, Mr.
Shubham Nagpal, Mr. Puneet
Munjal, Advocates.

versus

STATE OF NCT DELHI & ANR.

.....Respondents

Through: Mr. Yudhvir Singh Chauhan, APP.
Mr. Tanuj Dogra, Mr. Vivek
Pathak, Advocates for R-2.

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PRATEEK JALAN

ORDER

% **07.04.2026**

1. The petitioner has preferred the present petition under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 ["BNSS"] (corresponding to Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 ["CrPC"]), seeking quashing of FIR No. 124/2025 dated 21.02.2025, registered at Police Station Paschim Vihar East, Delhi, under Section 75 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 ["BNS"], alongwith all consequential proceedings arising therefrom, on the ground that the parties have amicably resolved their disputes and entered into a settlement.
2. The petitioner is present in person and has been identified by his learned counsel as well as by the Investigating Officer. Respondent No. 2 is also present in person and has been duly identified by her learned counsel and the Investigating Officer.
3. The petition is taken up for disposal with the consent of learned



counsel for the parties

4. The allegations, as emerging from the impugned FIR, are that the complainant came into contact with the accused (petitioner herein) through Facebook in January 2025, following which they began communicating over texts and calls. It is alleged that the accused misrepresented himself and, on that basis, induced the complainant to meet him on 19.01.2025, which was later postponed to 21.01.2025, during which he obtained her location and picked her up in his car. During these meetings, the accused is alleged to have engaged in inappropriate conduct and attempted to forcibly establish physical relations against her will. Upon her resistance, he is stated to have resorted to intimidation and coercion. It is further alleged that the accused thereafter took the complainant to different locations on false pretexts and continued to exert pressure on her.

5. It is further alleged that the accused subsequently involved one Sukwinder Singh Baath, who falsely projected himself as a police official, i.e. being a Station House Officer [“SHO”]. Both of them are stated to have thereafter threatened, harassed, and coerced the complainant and her family into arriving at a compromise, including by offering money and issuing threats of false criminal implication and harm to their reputation through repeated calls and message.

6. Mr. Yudhvir Singh Chauhan, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the State, has drawn my attention to paragraph 4 of the order dated 02.07.2025, to submit that the impugned FIR also contains allegations against the aforementioned – Sukhvinder Singh Baath, who has not been impleaded as a party to the present petition. The said order records as



follows:

“4. *The FIR also levels allegations against one Sukhvinder Singh Baath, alleged to be SHO in Punjab Police. Learned APP seeks and is allowed four weeks to file status report.*”

7. Pursuant thereto, a status report dated 09.12.2025 has been placed on record by Mr. Chauhan. Insofar as Sukhvinder Singh Baath is concerned, it is stated that notice under Section 35(3) BNS was served upon him on 09.03.2025, in compliance with which he joined the investigation and was thereafter relieved from of further interrogation. It is further reported that he has not been called for investigation again, despite the lapse of over one year, and that no chargesheet has been filed in the matter thus far. Both accused were also not arrested during the course of the investigation.

8. *Per contra*, Ms. Anushkaa Arora, learned counsel for the petitioner, submits that the gravamen of the dispute lies *inter se* between the petitioner and respondent No.2, and that the role attributed to the said Sukhvinder Singh Baath is limited to that of an intermediary, who sought to resolve the matter. She further submits that he is not, in fact, an SHO, as alleged in the FIR. It is also not in dispute that both the petitioner and respondent No.2 were married to their respective spouses at the time of the incident.

9. I am further informed that the parties were previously acquainted and that the dispute appears to have arisen out of a misunderstanding between them. The record also reflects that the parties have entered into an amicable settlement within a relatively short span of approximately three months from the registration of the FIR.

10. The parties have entered into a Memorandum of Understanding



dated 23.05.2025, wherein it is recorded that the disputes arose out of a misunderstanding between them and that they do not wish to pursue the criminal proceedings any further. It is also noted that the said settlement has been arrived at without any monetary consideration.

11. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, and in light of the settlement arrived at between the parties, they seek quashing of the impugned FIR and all consequential proceedings arising therefrom.

12. It is well settled that, even in respect of non-compoundable offences, the High Court may exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC and Section 528 of the BNSS to quash criminal proceedings where the parties have arrived at a settlement. Such power, however, is discretionary in nature and is to be exercised in accordance with the settled principles holding the field.

13. The Supreme Court, in *Gian Singh v. State of Punjab & Anr.*¹ has held as follows:

*“58. Where the High Court quashes a criminal proceeding having regard to the fact that the **dispute between the offender and the victim has been settled although the offences are not compoundable, it does so as in its opinion, continuation of criminal proceedings will be an exercise in futility and justice in the case demands that the dispute between the parties is put to an end and peace is restored; securing the ends of justice being the ultimate guiding factor.** No doubt, crimes are acts which have harmful effect on the public and consist in wrongdoing that seriously endangers and threatens the well-being of the society and it is not safe to leave the crime-doer only because he and the victim have settled the dispute amicably or that the victim has been paid compensation, yet certain crimes have been made compoundable in law, with or without the permission of the court. In respect of serious offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc., or other offences of mental depravity under IPC or offences of moral turpitude under special statutes, like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public*

¹ (2012) 10 SCC 303.



*servants while working in that capacity, the settlement between the offender and the victim can have no legal sanction at all. However, certain offences which overwhelmingly and predominantly bear civil flavour having arisen out of civil, mercantile, commercial, financial, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony, particularly relating to dowry, etc. or the family dispute, **where the wrong is basically to the victim and the offender and the victim have settled all disputes between them amicably, irrespective of the fact that such offences have not been made compoundable, the High Court may within the framework of its inherent power, quash the criminal proceeding or criminal complaint or FIR if it is satisfied that on the face of such settlement, there is hardly any likelihood of the offender being convicted and by not quashing the criminal proceedings, justice shall be casualty and ends of justice shall be defeated.** The above list is illustrative and not exhaustive. Each case will depend on its own facts and no hard-and-fast category can be prescribed.”²*

Further, in *Narinder Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Anr.*³, the Supreme Court has also laid down guidelines for High Courts while accepting settlement deeds between parties and quashing the proceedings. The relevant observations in the said decision read as under:

“29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down the following principles by which the High Court would be guided in giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties and exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings:

29.1. Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution.

29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure:

(i) ends of justice, or

² Emphasis supplied.

³ (2014) 6 SCC 466.



(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court.

While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives.

29.3. Such a power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, for the offences alleged to have been committed under special statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender.

29.4. On the other hand, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves.

29.5. While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases.”⁴

14. Applying the aforesaid principles to the present case, this Court is required to assess whether the continuation of the proceedings would serve any legitimate prosecutorial purpose or whether the same would amount to an abuse of process. The allegations in question, though falling under Section 75 of the BNS, arise out of a personal interaction between the parties, who were admittedly known to each other. The material in the FIR which relates to misconduct of Sukwinder Singh Baath, or impersonation of a police officer, have not been pursued by the prosecution. The material on record thus indicates that the dispute does not have any overarching public or societal ramifications so as to warrant its continuation despite settlement.

⁴ Emphasis supplied.



15. Further, respondent No. 2, upon a query put by this Court, has affirmed that she has, of her own volition, entered into the settlement at an early stage and does not wish to pursue the matter any further. In such circumstances, the likelihood of the prosecution culminating in a conviction appears remote. Additionally, the investigation has not progressed to the stage of filing of a chargesheet despite the lapse of a considerable period, which also weighs with this Court while exercising its discretion.

16. In view of the aforesaid, I am satisfied that the ends of justice would be served by bringing the proceedings to a quietus rather than permitting their continuation. There is, therefore, no legal impediment in quashing the impugned FIR and the proceedings emanating therefrom.

17. In light of the aforesaid, FIR No. 124/2025 dated 21.02.2025, registered at Police Station Paschim Vihar East, Delhi, under Section 75 of BNS, alongwith all consequential proceedings arising therefrom, is hereby quashed, subject to the petitioner depositing costs of Rs. 10,000/- with the Delhi High Court Bar Association Costs Account [A/C No. 15530110179338; IFSC No. UCBA0001553; UCO Bank, Delhi High Court Branch] within a period of two weeks. An affidavit of compliance be filed within two weeks thereafter.

18. The parties shall remain bound by the terms of the settlement.

19. The petition, alongwith pending application, if any, stand disposed of.

PRATEEK JALAN, J

APRIL 7, 2026

'Bhupi'/SD/